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Reconciling Conflicting Identities:
How National and Religious Identities Influence
the Decision to Marry in Egypt
Courtney P. Erwin1
Karim and Layla2 met at the American University in Cairo (AUC) and
dated for three years. During those three years, they experienced the usual
ups and downs of a young relationship. Both Karim and Layla also
struggled with the implacable problem of falling for the fundamentally
“wrong” person: Karim is a Muslim, and Layla is a Copt.3 Karim and Layla
knew that their relationship dangerously navigated around hostile
boundaries. After too many familial battles, the Coptic boy and the Muslim
girl resigned themselves to the inevitable and broke up. After all, a future
together was nearly impossible—where would they get married, and who
would marry them? No one in Egypt would challenge the explicit religious
prohibitions against interfaith marriage,4 much less compromise one’s own
convictions concerning such an illicit union. Nor would the Egyptian
government offer Karim and Layla protection against discriminatory
religious postures, the government having implemented legislation
relegating family law, including marriage, to one’s individual religion.5
Had they decided to stay together and to marry outside Egypt, Karim and
Layla would have lost their friends and families and would have faced legal
complications within Egypt.6
While friendships between the Muslim majority and Coptic minority
populations are accepted in Egypt, romantic relations crossing the religious
divide are not. Religious identification is a large part of the dynamic
between today’s Egyptian Muslims and Copts. This religious identification
legitimizes discrimination by each religion against the other in order to
protect the religious legacy of both groups. The legal and socioreligious
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culture prohibiting interfaith marriage confirms the quandary facing
contemporary Egyptians, which is to either defend the survival of one’s
culture and religion by marrying within the same faith, or to reinterpret
one’s culture and religion so that it reflects modern ideals of religious
freedom and equality, including the right to marry whomever one loves.
Allowing Coptic-Muslim unions could result in homogenization that
would cause damage to cultural and religious diversity and lead to the
gradual disappearance of centuries-old tradition. Even so, current methods
of preserving religious identities are weathering an antagonistic onslaught
from the international human rights arena and causing a slow loss of
legitimacy among the religions’ own adherents. The once incontestable
social condemnation against interfaith relationships is slowly beginning to
suffer small cracks in its construction. Neither Layla’s nor Karim’s parents
would ever have considered dating someone outside their respective
religions, but Layla and Karim developed a romantic relationship despite
knowing that they would never marry. This progression is a small but
significant step in today’s Egyptian society.
In this article, I analyze the conflict between Egypt’s Copts and
Muslims.7 More specifically, I examine the conflict between their religious
identities in relation to the national identity of modern Egyptians in a
globalized society. Both religious identities promote discrimination based
on religion while the national identity of modern Egyptians promotes
religious tolerance and freedom from discrimination. In order to reconcile
the religious identities of the Copts and Muslims with the national identity
of Egypt, the religious identity must reform. Any substantive change in the
area of marriage in Egypt must occur through a process of religious
introspection. For Egyptian society to accept the marriage of Layla and
Karim, Copts and Muslims need to transform their religious identities, but
the Egyptian government and the national legal system cannot create this
change alone.

LAW AND IDENTITY

Reconciling Conflicting Identities

In Part I, I present the three identities at issue: Coptic, Muslim, and the
Egyptian national identity and examine what happens when they intersect.
In Part II, I explore the areas of conflict expressed in the Egyptian legal
arena and compare the Egyptian laws pertaining to non-Muslim–Muslim
relationships with the international human rights standards protecting
freedom of religion and religious minorities. Finally, in Part III, I confront
the possibility of reconciling this conflict and propose that religious
transformation precede, or guide, legal activism.

I. RELIGIOUS VERSUS NATIONAL IDENTITIES
In Egypt, modern notions of equality, religious tolerance, and nondiscrimination collide with the preservation of religious norms and
restrictions. This collision occurs at the crossroads of identities. In order to
respond to this conflict, it is necessary to understand these identities;
specifically, the Coptic and Muslim identities and the national, Egyptian
identity. The latter is created by the Egyptian legal and political structure,
which is guided by an overarching international configuration advocating a
universal human rights model.
A. Religious Identities
The relationship between the Copts and the Muslims in Egypt is built
upon centuries of interaction, isolation, comity, and conflict. At times, the
relationship has been tenuous and uneasy, but it has also been courteous and
calm. The most patent features of the historical interface are the carefully
fashioned contours of the respective religious identities and the boundaries
erected around those identities. Since the Islamic invasion of Egypt in AD
640, Muslims have enjoyed the status of the Egyptian majority, wielding
political, economic, and social dominance.8 The Copts, on the other hand,
have lived as a religious minority within Egypt since the founding of the
Coptic Church in Alexandria in AD 55.9 As a religious minority, the Copts
have suffered from an assortment of discriminatory practices, committed
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both officially by the Egyptian government and informally by Egyptian
society.10
This history of Coptic-Muslim interaction is most commonly studied and
discussed with respect to the impact of religious discrimination on political
rights,11 minority protection,12 and religious freedom.13 These studies and
discussions tend to give clarity to the greater international human rights
discourse on discrimination, in which the granting or denying of political
power based on one’s religion is often unmistakable. However, I am
interested in the ambiguous areas of Muslim-Coptic discrimination, in
which the lines of demarcation are not so clear and are, in fact, difficult to
address. The subject of marriage occupies this realm of ambiguity.
Marriage presents a rich study in the complex and changing disposition
of religious identities and how these Muslim and Coptic identities affect
national identity and religious discrimination in Egypt. An awareness of the
discriminatory practices of Muslims and Copts in the area of marriage will
add another, perhaps illuminating, perspective to the human rights
discussion around religious discrimination. Additionally, this perspective
might be useful to those who are struggling to effectively understand and
address the global occurrence of religious discrimination in local societies.
1. Muslim Identity
The religion of Islam occupies a central role in the lives of Muslims, like
Karim, in Egypt. The centrality of Islam can be credited, in part, to a
genuine belief and adherence to its religious dictates, while part of Islam’s
influence is attributable to tradition and socioreligious pressure. The former
dimension—that of personal and private devotion to religious dictates—is
demonstrated by the observance of prayer (five times daily) and the monthlong fast (Ramadan).14 Conversely, the Egyptian law that requires each
individual to carry an identity card that clearly declares one’s religion15
illustrates the manifestation of the socioreligious demands. Egyptians
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confirm their religious affiliation every time they present their identity card,
which is regularly.16
The relationship between religion and law is one of the most powerful
relationships in Islam. Religious identity and legal identity are inextricably
bound: religion provides the system of belief, and law, necessarily
presupposing this belief, conducts and regulates every movement of the
believer.17 Although Islamic law—Shari‘a in Arabic—is not the law in
Egypt today,18 it is a persistent and pervasive presence in the life of modernday Muslims.19 Accordingly, the religious identity of Egyptian Muslims
cannot be divorced from the authority of the Shari‘a.20
Perhaps the most compelling aspect of the legal component of Islam is its
unique brand of legitimacy: the Shari‘a is dependent upon a transcendental
authority.21 Both the religious and legal dictates spring forth from the
Qur’an, which Muslims believe is the literal word of God.22 While the
Qur’an contains certain explicit dictates that require little or no
interpretation, jurists trained in legal methodology must extract much of the
law from the text.23 While there is a vibrant element of human interaction
in the mining of divine legal rules, the idea that God reveals the law
presents a formidable barrier to any other legal (or belief/value) system
wholly created through human effort (i.e., not God-centered) that intends to
supercede the Shari‘a.
The Shari‘a and its legal formulations governing non-Muslim–Muslim
affairs are largely responsible for fashioning the Muslim perceptions of
minorities. Consequently, this view of minorities is firmly incorporated
into the Muslim identity. Arising from this view and its importance in
Muslim identity is the role that Muslims assume in the contemporary
dynamic between Copts and Muslims. As Sudanese Islamic law and human
rights scholar Abdullahi an-Na‘im asserts, “Non-Muslim minorities within
an Islamic state do not enjoy rights equal to those of the Muslim
majority.”24
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While the Shari‘a guarantees minorities many rights,25 the minority
communities retain those rights only if they submit to Muslim
sovereignty.26 A number of restrictions accompany the afforded rights.27
The relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, which operates under
cover of religious legitimacy, results in an inherently discriminatory
imbalance. The unequal Muslim-Copt relationship is typified by the
dominance of the Muslim majority28 and is maintained because Muslims
believe that their own religious law authorizes such dominance.29 To tinker
in this area of relational inequities is to compromise an entrenched legalreligious identity.
2. Coptic Identity
The identity of Copts, like Layla for example, is shaped around their
minority status. Living as Christians in a country where religion is the
determinative feature of life has had a marked impact on Coptic identity.
Even though Muslims have always tolerated Copts, Copts perceive their
history in Muslim Egypt as one of persecution.30 Even during more placid
periods, Copts were never divested of their badge of inferiority and were
always subject to the restrictions placed upon them by the Muslim majority.
Copts developed a sense of resentment and distrust because of systematic
and ingrained discrimination.31 This is a resentment that is reinforced today
by the fact that many restrictions have never been abandoned32 and that
persecution continues by Egyptian officials33 and individuals.34
Historically, one of the “rights” afforded to minorities—known as
dhimmis—under the Shari‘a was internal autonomy.35 This autonomy was
premised upon a separation of the communities by religion. Accordingly,
the Copts, who were the dhimmis in Egypt, enjoyed a degree of internal
community autonomy to conduct their personal and private affairs in
accordance with their religious law and customs.36 Because the worldview
of Muslims was, and continues to be, premised upon rigid religious
demarcations, as long as the Copts submitted publicly to Islamic political
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rule, the Muslims were not inclined to impose their religion privately upon
religious minorities. To the Muslims, it would make little sense to insist
upon a Copt’s adherence to Islamic direction. In the domain of the purely
religious, Muslims were, and are still, content not to interfere.
The desire to separate the religions not only encouraged autonomy but
also allowed Muslims to impose restrictions upon Copts. The restrictions
were to clearly define the boundaries between the two religious spheres; if
the Muslim majority perceived the Christian minority to be publicly
encroaching upon their domain, for example, by constructing new churches,
the Copts were to desist in such activity.37 Conversely, because the Copts
were in no way encroaching upon Muslim territory in the area of marriage,
the Copts were free to dictate their own laws in areas untouched by Islamic
law:38
[I]n any situation where applicable Islamic law and any other
religious law were in conflict, it was always Islamic law that was
controlling.
The subordinate status of the non-Muslim
communities meant that they were subject to Islamic law in matters
where the interests of Muslims or the Muslim community were
deemed to be affected.39
In essence, Egypt advanced a sociolegal structure of religious separation
that was not equal.
This religious autonomy allowed for an insulated Coptic community to
fundamentally ground itself in its religious identity. Accordingly, Copts in
Egyptian society lived in separate areas and, while they were subject to the
above-mentioned restrictions, they were allowed to determine their religious
belief system and laws.40 As a result, Copts imposed boundaries between
themselves and the greater Muslim majority to achieve distance from the
oppressive majority whom they distrusted and disliked and to enjoy the
freedom granted in their religious lives.41 What also resulted, however, was
a discriminatory attitude initiated by Copts toward Muslims. The Copts, in
their preference for isolation from the Muslims, placed restrictions on their
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own interaction with the Muslims because as the minority, they were not
entitled to place restrictions upon the Muslims.42 The social, religious, and
legal dividing line for the Copts was also premised upon religious affiliation
and affected the Coptic-Muslim relations in a different but still
discriminatory manner.
In today’s Egypt, Copts cannot escape from the entrenched history of
guarded and restricted interaction. The modern era has increased and
intensified Muslim-Coptic relations but has not been able to erase the
mentality that drove the Copts into self-isolation in the first place. While
Copts now work with Muslims and count Muslims amongst their friends,
the uneasy whisper of distrust has not completely disappeared.43
Unfortunately, the Coptic hesitation to disengage from their voluntary
segregation is enforced by Coptic-Muslim clashes, which are reminiscent of
the past.44 The opportunities to change and move out of the traditional
restraints are not entirely forthcoming.
B. National Identity
Muslims and Copts hold two identities—one rooted in their religious
beliefs and another centered on their unified national identity as
Egyptians.45 This national identity attains its legitimacy through the
“common allegiance to the nation as a basis for solidarity.”46 National
identity erases any lines drawn to preserve the partition of religions. In fact,
religion no longer has the authority to regulate social interactions if it, in
any way, contradicts the laws of Egypt.47 The religious identifiers of
“Copt” and “Muslim” defer to the national identifier of “Egyptian.”
By dimming religious identifiers, the national identity presents new
challenges to the Coptic-Muslim interaction.48 The political organization
and the human rights values that the nation-state engenders have shaped a
national identity in Egypt that is, in many ways, incompatible with the
religious identities of Egypt’s Muslim majority and Coptic minority.49 For
instance, the nation-state construction disrupts the religious bifurcation of
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society by assuming control of the law through governments that enact
uniform national laws in codified form.50 The dislocation of the law from
religious control presents a number of problems for Egyptian society and its
religiously oriented and ordered populace.
The history of interaction between Copts and Muslims, which was
previously governed by religious laws and customs, must now contend with
the intrusion of a legal system that presumes to dictate all aspects of their
public, and to some extent, private lives but that is not constituted under
religious criteria. Through the conjunction of the state and the law, the state
becomes the master regulator of society, directing everything from personal
status to institutions. Muslims and Copts now face a modern nation-state
premised on “a legal system in which citizens have equal rights and
obligations.”51
Similarly, as a nation-state, Egypt is not only part of the international
patchwork comprised of other nation-states but is also a willing participant
in the evolving formation of a unified and collaborative international
community.52 As part of its commitment to international participation,
Egypt is expected and pressured to comply with the guiding moral authority
of international human rights standards.53 Whether the specific directives of
these international standards are binding or nonbinding, they “articulate
general legal principles and approximate the sentiments of the international
community.”54 The emergence of the nation of Egypt entitles its citizenry
to a corpus of shared international values as well as formalized laws.55
Egyptian citizens not only confront their new national identity but also the
international influences and effects upon that national identity.
C. The Intersection of Identities
Because national law has supplanted religious law in Egypt, both
Muslims and Copts confront a restructuring of the sociolegal organization
and intersection of identities, albeit in different ways. Muslims must
grapple with the reality of a secular national legal system trumping their
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divinely ordained Shari‘a.56 Egyptian national law attempts to marginalize
religion as a defining norm in politics and society and divests Muslims of
their sanctioned legal dominance. Copts, on the other hand, are embroiled
in a different predicament. While national law benefits them by disrupting
the sociolegal inequities premised upon religious differences, it also
threatens to crumble the pocket of seclusion that has become the
comfortable home of Copts in Egypt. Egypt’s national laws compromise
the religious laws that have ordered Coptic relations with their Muslim
neighbors.57 What remains for both Copts and Muslims alike is a choice
provoked by the change in legal paradigms: nation versus religion.
The influence and evolution of cultural norms further exacerbate the
religion versus national dilemma. In Egypt, Copts and Muslims behave
according to the tradition that has developed around the religious
disposition.58 Even in the absence of strict legal regulations, the two groups
conform to parameters set by the Coptic and Muslim communities.59 Since
the beginning of colonization and modernization in the nineteenth century,
Egyptians have experienced the massive influence of external forces,
including foreign and international principles of equality, religious
tolerance, and cross-religious interaction.60 Egyptians have traveled beyond
their borders and have lived in societies in which national laws and the
values that they promote are not plagued by a battle with religion. The
burgeoning consciousness that is born out of the amplification of external
association is an uneasy blend of tradition and modernity.

II. MARRIAGE—INTERSECTION AND CONFLICT
In Egypt, the legal, national, cultural, and religious spheres all converge
at marriage. At its most basic, marriage is a defender of identity, and in
Egypt, one’s identity is one’s religion. Those who marry within the
religious community promise to abide by the tradition and culture of that
community; there are no introductions of foreign beliefs that could
influence the next generation to promote unfamiliar ideas about religion.61
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Therefore, in Egypt, where religious identities abut each other, culture and
certain laws clearly define marriage for the respective religious groups and
protect the religious identities from threat of dilution. Any change to this
structure surrounding marriage compromises the religious identities of both
commingling groups. If Muslims and Copts redefine their traditional
understandings of marriage, they must also reform their religions.
A. Ambiguities of Tolerance
When there is a call for religious tolerance, which would potentially
collapse certain inequitable distinctions, Muslims and Copts alike balk:
“[O]ne cannot be expected to tolerate a clearly defined threat to who one is,
to one’s identity.”62 Discriminatory regulations controlling marriage are
vitally important to both the Coptic and Muslim communities precisely
because these regulations ensure that religious boundaries are clearly
defined and rigorously observed.63 As Adam Seligman observes,
[G]roups have boundaries, and cannot exist without these
boundaries. One cannot make claims to any type of identity
without that identity being defined, which in some senses involves
it being bounded and circumscribed as well. To ask a group to
tolerate what threatens that identity is to ask the group to dismantle
itself—to make itself cease to be.64
Thus, the most fundamental function of marriage in both the Coptic and
Muslim communities in Egypt is to assert and to sustain the boundaries that
preserve the respective religious identities, using discriminatory measures
when necessary.65
Conversely, the discussion surrounding modern notions of religious
freedom calls for tolerance and condemns discrimination.66 The nature of
this freedom is very different from the religious freedom afforded by the
Muslims to minorities discussed above. The tolerance advocated in the
modern era is not premised upon separate spheres of existence but is instead
rooted in inclusion and openness. This discussion around religious
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freedom, arising from a concern for the rights of religious minorities,
attempts to promote their welfare by eradicating discriminatory measures
based on religion. In some areas such as political participation, the minority
is severely disadvantaged by its exclusion from this domain. Accordingly,
the promise of religious freedom coupled with protection from
discrimination clearly advances the political position of the minority in its
respective society. However, in other areas where religion is implicated,
such as marriage, the desire for religious freedom is muted because the
benefits are not so apparent.
In relation to marriage in Egypt, the public/private distinction is central to
creating and maintaining religious boundaries. Marriage can act as the most
effective preserver of religious identity because of its traditional place in the
private realm, where it is accountable only to religious laws and not national
regulation.67 Because of their private position in Egyptian society, marriage
laws can be discriminatory in their effort to perpetuate religious heritage.68
As I have explained, both Copts and Muslims discriminate against the
other to remain distinct and to ensure each group’s cohesive continuity over
time.69 The two religious communities live in a society in which
discrimination in the area of marriage is a shared and mutually honored
value. If they choose to eradicate discriminatory measures in marriage,
each necessarily exposes its respective religious sphere to an “other,”
signaling the demise of both of the adherents’ religious identities as they
know them.
A crisis erupts when national law and international values promoting
religious tolerance and freedom from discrimination intrude upon the
zealously guarded province of religious identity, as they do in the case of
marriage in Egypt. This intrusion is complicated and conflicted. Both
Muslims and Copts have a strong impulse to erect communal boundaries in
order to defend their religious identities. However, they also experience a
countervailing and persuasive inclination to transgress their boundaries and
redefine their religions according to the changes affecting the world outside
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their communities.70 The result is that the walls that encase their religious
identities can be very tenuous at times.
Generally, these walls constitute the margins of these religious groups.
And it is at the walls, rather than at the nucleus, that most struggles occur;
Muslims and Copts reconstruct and redraw lines without infringing upon
their communities’ core values and underpinning beliefs. However, a
redefinition of marriage does not transpire at the edge of the religious
boundaries but trespasses into the very heart of the religion.
B. Egyptian Law
Marriage laws in Egypt belong to the corpus of personal status laws, or
“family law.”71 For the most part, Copts and Muslims have been free to
control marriage in accordance with their own laws because family law was
left relatively untouched by colonial efforts and was relatively unaffected by
subsequent national legislation.72
Historically, conservative Muslims and Muslim religious leaders were
keen to see the personal status rules of the Shari‘a retained. In fact, they
have largely succeeded.73 Because Egypt has crafted its marriage laws
around the legacy of the Shari‘a, the Egyptian government has refrained
from enacting uniform national legislation in matters such as divorce, child
custody, and marriage; it has been very clear which personal status laws
apply to which religious group.74 Because the Shari‘a laws affecting these
matters require non-Muslim–Muslim distinctions, it makes sense that so
long as the Shari‘a is upheld, the Copts will be governed by the laws of
their own religion in matters of personal status.75
With respect to marriage, the Shari‘a allows Muslim men to marry nonMuslim women but prohibits Muslim women from marrying non-Muslim
men.76 Muslims justify this law by pointing to the historical legal inequality
between Muslims and non-Muslims.
Ann Mayer explains the
rationalization of the historical inequality:
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The assumption is that, just as Muslims are placed above nonMuslims, so men are placed above women, meaning that wives are
necessarily subordinated to their husbands. Therefore, the Muslim
man who marries a female dhimmi [non-Muslim] does not infringe
the hierarchy of status, since by virtue of her sex the non-Muslim
wife will be subordinate to her husband, who as a Muslim and a
male ranks above her on two counts. In contrast, the Muslim
woman who marries a dhimmi violates the rules of status, since as
a wife she has lower status than the man to whom she is married
even though by virtue of her adherence to the Islamic religion she
should rank above him.77
While the prohibition explicitly outlaws a marriage between a Muslim
woman and non-Muslim man, in practice the prohibition is also applied to
Muslim men and non-Muslim women.78
The corpus of law promulgated by the Coptic Church is the Coptic canon
law, which also places restrictions upon its Coptic adherents. A Coptic
woman who marries a Muslim man is excommunicated, and a Muslim
woman who wishes to marry a Coptic man must convert in order for the
marriage to be recognized within the Coptic Church.79 In practice, a
Muslim man or woman who converts to Christianity could be charged with
apostasy (abandonment of Islam) by his or her fellow Muslims and could
suffer legal consequences.80 In many cases, one’s family would abandon
such a person. In essence, the Coptic and Muslim restrictions upon
marriage work well together to legally and effectively prevent any desire or
reality of a Copt-Muslim marriage. In Egypt, the laws of marriage as
erected by religion discriminate against Muslim–non-Muslim alliances out
of a perceived superiority on the part of Muslims, a coveted insularity on
the part of the Copts, and an effort to forestall a completely objectionable
mixing of the religions by both sides.
The relegation of family law to Egypt’s respective religious communities
has not left it entirely independent of state intrusion and influence. Since
the late 1920s and more dramatically since the 1970s, the Egyptian state has
nominally legislated in certain areas of the family law. For example, Egypt
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most recently amended the Personal Status Law on January 27, 2000, to
create a minimum age requirement for marriage, marriage guardianship
regulations, and to lift certain divorce restrictions.81
There is also an interesting dynamic between the courts and the
legislature in the matter of hisba suits. Hisba is a doctrine that entitles any
Muslim to take legal action against anyone or anything that he or she
considers to be harmful to Islam.82 On June 14, 1995, a Cairo appeals court
for personal status litigation ruled that Dr. Nasr Hamed Abu Zeid, a
professor at Cairo University, must be separated from his wife.83 A few
individuals accused the professor of writing opinions that rejected some
fundamental tenets of Islam and filed suit on the grounds that his Muslim
wife could not be married to an apostate.84 After the court issued the muchpublicized decision, Abu Zeid and his wife were forced to travel with
guards at all times because they feared violent attacks on their lives.85
Finally, Dr. Abu Zeid and his wife decided to leave “the siege” in Egypt
and resettled in the Netherlands.86
In the aftermath of the contentious ruling in Abu Zeid’s case, the
Egyptian government asked parliament to amend the hisba law, allowing
only the prosecutor-general to file such cases after receiving complaints
from individuals, thereby preventing claims by private individuals.
Parliament granted the request and passed Law No. 3/1996.87 Despite
passage of the law, the hisba suits did not stop and another highly
publicized trial followed in 2001. A lawyer took the controversial Muslim
writer and feminist Nawal el-Saadawi to court claiming that she insulted
Islam, was an apostate, and could no longer remain married to her
husband.88 This time, the Personal Status Court rejected the lawsuit and
ruled, in accordance with the amended hisba law, that the lawyer had
overstepped his legal boundaries in his attempt to divorce Saadawi from her
husband and reaffirmed that only the prosecutor-general could file such
claims.89 While this was a step forward, the hisba law still legally exists,
albeit in narrowed application.90 The intersection between law, society, and
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government as it concretely affects the marriage of two people in
contemporary Egyptian society is brought to life in these cases.
Finally, the relationship between the family laws of both religions and
Egypt’s Constitution has its own contradictions and difficulties. The
marriage laws promulgated by both Copts and Muslims discriminate against
all outside religions while Egypt’s Constitution provides for equal public
rights and duties without discrimination of religion or creed.91 The
Constitution declares that “the State shall guarantee the freedom of belief
and the freedom of practice of religious rights.”92 Thus, there is an uneasy
balance between the nondiscriminatory code in the public domain, which is
subject to national legislation, and the discriminatory religious freedom in
the private realm.93
C. International Law and the Antidiscrimination Momentum
Today’s nations are not only subject to international law but are greatly
influenced and necessarily responsive to international declarations,
decisions, and the values that underpin the public exhortations of the
international law-making community. As a participant in the international
community, Egypt is legally accountable to certain international human
rights instruments and is also heavily influenced by the general human
rights atmosphere.94
The protection of religious freedom and religious minorities from
persecution and discrimination is a primary and enduring concern for the
drafters of international human rights declarations and resolutions.95 The
ideals of freedom of religion and nondiscrimination based on religion find
themselves at an interesting intersection in Egypt.
The international documents advocating for religious freedom promote
what Egypt seems to already provide its citizens. For example, Article 18
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the foundational
document in international human rights law, secures “the right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion.”96 Article 18 of the International
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also protects freedom of
religion and explicitly allows for conversion (of one’s religion to another)
without impairment. The ICCPR also provides for a liberal capacity to
publicly manifest one’s religion “in worship, observance, practice, and
teaching.”97 Egypt does not deny these guarantees of religious freedom; in
fact, Egypt affords Copts their space to practice and believe as they desire—
as long as their practices do not infringe upon the Muslim community.98
Thus, Egypt respects the religious freedom of both its Muslim and Coptic
populations.
International human rights documents move beyond a surface assurance
of religious freedom in one’s national territory and recognize special rights
for religious minorities. In many ways, the nature of these rights accords
with Egypt’s social divisions and the separation of its religious
communities. For example, the UN’s Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, or Linguistic Minorities (the
Declaration) protects and promotes the minority’s independent identity,
allowing for a generous degree of autonomy from the majority
populations.99 The Declaration promises religious minorities the “right to
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use
their own language, in private and in public”100 as well as “the right to
establish and maintain their own associations.”101 On its face, Egypt seems
to grant the Copts their right to maintain and develop their internal religious
identity and culture free from external interference.
The companion principle to freedom of religion, however, is the right to
be free from religious discrimination. It is here that the international
requirements of religious freedom and Egypt’s compliance with them
encounter difficulty. As we have seen, both the Copts and Muslims in
Egypt practice discriminatory measures premised upon religion and
evidenced in their marriage laws by excluding cross-religious unions. In
affording both religions their “religious freedom,” the religions freely
discriminate.
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The practice of religious discrimination perpetrated by both the Copts
and the Muslims against each other and enforced by national legislation,
clearly does not correspond with the international prohibition of religious
discrimination. Conversely, the international human rights standards
promoting nondiscrimination intrude upon the province of religious
freedom. If discrimination is perpetuated in the practice of one’s own
religious freedom, that feature of the freedom can be circumscribed.102 The
UDHR103 and the ICCPR clearly prohibit any discrimination in the law
based on religion,104 and the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief
further articulates the principle that “[n]o one shall be subject to
discrimination by any State, institution, group of persons, or person on the
grounds of religion or other belief.”105
Most of the documents addressing religious discrimination do not
specifically speak to marriage. The lack of discussion regarding marriage is
the result of the intensely personal nature of the marital interest and the
reluctance of the international community to legislate in the personal
sphere. Only the UDHR ventures a note about discrimination when it
comes to marriage: “Men and women of full age, without any limitation
due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a
family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage
and at its dissolution.”106 The UDHR deposits the rights surrounding
marriage into the hands of the individuals involved rather than their
religious communities. The two positions, then, appear irreconcilable.

III. PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION
The arrangement of marriage in Egyptian society poses a barrier to those
who no longer believe in discriminating against one’s religious neighbors in
the most intimate sphere of existence and finds itself precariously
navigating between the rights of religious freedom and nondiscrimination.
Relegating marriage laws to the private sphere where marriage is regulated
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by religious prescriptions and bolstered by an unyielding conviction that
religious integration leads to the corruption of the community’s religious
identity issues a daunting impediment to refashioning the perspective
encircling marriage in Egypt. Even so, Egyptian society is slowly but
surely inching closer to an inevitable conclusion: the laws prohibiting CoptMuslim marriage will have to change. The question at this stage is what is
the best course for Egypt to assume?
A. Challenges
There are a number of challenges that must be faced and properly
resolved in order for all of the necessary parts of Egyptian society to work
together in an effort to erase religious discrimination from the marriage
table. The overarching issue is that of identity. Effectively, the eradication
of all of Egypt’s discriminatory marriage regulations asks Copts and
Muslims alike to favor national laws that draw upon international values
above religious laws that depend upon the tradition and history of the
community. The most salient problem of choosing between national and
religious identity is the fear that in choosing the former, the latter will be
comprised. In other words, it is presumed that the two identities are
antithetical to one another and endanger the existence of the other. Personal
beliefs, family, history, authority, and familiarity or territorial affiliation,
modernization, liberalism, international legitimacy, and change convolute
the choice for both the individual and society. Religion will prevail and
personal conviction will compel the individual’s choice, and if it does not,
social and familial pressure will. Marriage carries a heavy implication that
to tinker with its formulation is to jeopardize the continuance of the
religious community.
Associated with the national-religious choice is an internal/external
debate. In the case of Egypt, a national predilection is regarded with some
degree of suspicion because it does not spring from either of the indigenous
religious communities. The notion of the nation-state is entirely foreign to
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the religious ordering that Egypt subscribed to prior to a very bitterly
remembered imperialist colonial effort. Religious communities regard the
idea of national laws, independent of religious persuasion, as an imposition
from the outside. The connection between the nation-state and international
legal standards only enhances the indigenous religious community’s
alienation from those external and entirely unfamiliar laws. Conversely,
laws predicated upon religion are internally generated and considered
legitimate and authoritative.
In effecting change, it is important to consider the willingness of the
parties involved to engage in a social, legal, and religious transformation.
Do both Copts and Muslims genuinely want a modification in the laws of
marriage in their country? If they do, what is the nature of that desire, and
how do they intend to act upon its realization? For example, like Layla and
Karim, certain parts of both the Coptic and Muslim communities (the
younger generation of the privileged classes) do want the freedom to marry
across religious lines. That aspiration, however, is riddled with conflict due
in large part to the older generation’s condemnation. If the discord is
exceptionally (or even less) intimidating, then the prospects for either side
to initiate change may be thwarted; it may be easier to avoid a seemingly
unassailable, much less unapproachable, dilemma than to bravely weather
the penalties of one’s daring.
The readiness of individual Copts and Muslims to create change must be
assessed by the social climate. The individuals calling for change may not
be representative of the larger community, which may also have a greater
momentum for stasis than for revolution. The change ordered must not
venture too far or too quickly lest it trigger a vehement opposition capable
of snuffing the initial spark.107 Concrete and substantive social, legal, and
religious transformation may safely proceed only when built upon a solid
foundation. Without an appraisal of the readiness of the society, the effort
by willing Copts and Muslims may fail or walk a precipice of uncertainty
and instability.
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B. Change—Religious or Legal?
Insight and appreciation of the matter itself is indispensable to unraveling
the intricacies of marriage laws in Egypt and creating change. The first step
is to determine and define the playing field and to query where and how the
proposed change will take place. Marriage resides in both the legal and
religious provinces and can be affected by substantive alterations in either
sphere. Whether to undertake a legal solution or a religious solution is
perhaps the most salient decision to be made.
The paths are not entirely disengaged; rather, religion and law must
cooperate and collaborate if meaningful evolution of a contentious issue is
to occur. In Egypt, where law and religion have been and continue to be so
closely aligned and interrelated, to divorce one from the other would be
unnatural and debilitating. In order to cultivate the optimal working
relationship between the legal and the religious spheres, society must
delineate the respective legal and religious roles and responsibilities.
Society must also be sensitive to the particular needs of the country
involved. Although the larger issue is one of legal reform in discriminatory
marriage laws, it is imperative to approach the marriage issue with an
Egyptian-oriented solution as the objective.
Even though religion and law are closely interrelated, change must begin
with religion rather than law. Immediate legal reform will not move
religion to harmonize itself with the law. In fact, if the government was to
remove family law from its religious domain and was to strike the
discriminatory elements, it is likely that such a step would be entirely
cosmetic and largely ignored in practice. Legal reform alone would provide
little conviction and no buttressing foundation for change. The inherent
problem faced by many Copts and Muslims like Layla and Karim of
refraining from marrying the person one wants to be with—regardless of
religious affiliation—would still exist because the religious communities
would continue to instill the discriminatory principle and would more
directly enforce it than the law’s newly fashioned matrimonial liberty.
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The fundamental place of religion in Egyptian society necessarily leads
to the conclusion that change must occur within the religion. A change in
religion will subsequently lead to a call, issued from the religious
communities themselves, for legal modification of marriage laws reflecting
the religious reformation. Not only will the change be authentic, sincere,
and deeply rooted in both the belief and practice of the religious
communities, but it will also peacefully accord with national and
international legislation. Neither national nor international legislation will
be compromised or hindered. The law must encourage and must be open to
the transformation of belief. The legal system ought not stifle the
restructuring of religious beliefs; instead, it should provide an opportunity
for the law to represent the new, religious determination.108
In Egypt, the national legislation should not prohibit the revision of
marriage laws that freely permit Copt-Muslim unions. Likewise, it should
not thwart modernity and cultural, social, and religious change. If Muslims,
for example, were to move away from discrimination, but the Copts were to
refrain from such movement, the government of Egypt should use its
resources to enforce the tolerant Muslim posture rather than promote the
discriminatory Coptic stance. The national legal system must make it
difficult for the religious communities to persist in their discrimination.
C. A Regime of Tolerance
The most crucial step in ending discriminatory marriage practices in
Egypt is inviting a regime of tolerance into the belief systems of both
religious communities. Assigning the law to its rightful place as a promoter
of positive change emanating within the religion, as opposed to viewing the
law as a sluggish defender of a negative religious status quo, raises a
pressing question: What needs to happen to counsel a reformation in the
religious community’s values, beliefs, and perceptions? The answer is that
Egypt must first determine whether the religious values are out of balance
with the practice of the individuals. In Egypt, it appears that both Muslims
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and Copts are moving in a direction that is not in peaceful balance with the
religious dictates. The younger generation, as evinced by the relationship
between Layla and Karim, is timidly questioning what was once the
unquestionable. Egypt must also determine whether the religious values in
its religious communities are valid in relation to the larger international
community. Egypt must recognize that the concerns and fears about losing
religious identity do not justify retreating from the issue of discrimination in
marriage. If discrimination is removed from their marriage laws, both
Copts and Muslims are right to fear that their respective religious identities
will not survive in their present form. The loss of insulated and
endogamous religious identities does not justify the maintenance of a
sociolegal scheme that prevents religious intermarriage. The belief systems
of both religious communities must promote a regime of tolerance and
understanding.
If marriage were perceived as a positive part of an acceptable reformation
of their religious identities, Muslims and Copts could accommodate the
prospect of amalgamation rather than decry it as corruption of religious
identity. A solid adherence to tolerance would allow for such to happen. In
other words, Muslims and Copts would need to accept and tolerate each
other at the most intimate level. In order to do this, both groups must
conceive of such tolerance of the other and welcome and regard the new
possibility of interaction as a positive contribution to the religious identities,
a contribution that enriches their lives. Both communities would need to
embrace the value of tolerance in order to annul the value of discrimination,
as it is inherently intolerant.
In order to arrive at and to welcome the value of tolerance, the Copts and
Muslims need to reassess the thick boundaries that they have erected
throughout the centuries of their coexistence.109 While the boundaries were
vital in a society entirely ordered by religion, they are now anachronistic.
The modern world establishes and promotes interaction that crosses all
boundaries, barriers, lines, and blockades. It is a reality that engenders a
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belief in absolute respect and tolerance for one another. Therefore, while I
cannot in this article offer a substantive framework or process by which
Muslims and Copts can proactively begin their necessary paths towards
tolerance, I do advocate for the continued openness to new ideas and
experiences that has already begun. External influences and experiences
have encouraged the first tentative line of questioning. Having opened this
door, I do not believe that it will be closed.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Muslim-Copt relationship in Egypt today is informed by a long
history of religious identification. Both religious communities discriminate
against the other as a way of preserving their religious heritage. This is
nowhere more apparent and poignant than in the laws of marriage, where
cross-religious unions are prohibited by each religion and are fortified
through national deference to religion. While the younger individuals of
both faiths in Egyptian society rarely challenge this guarded law in a blatant
manner, the inability to marry someone of the other religion is no longer
comfortably accepted. The story of Layla and Karim attests to this
emerging discomfort, if not quiet rebellion, that is slowly bleeding into the
Coptic-Muslim romantic relations of today.
In order for these laws to change and to reflect more national and
international standards, a genuine reformation in religious thought must
precede its legal extinction. Copts and Muslims need to allow their
boundaries to fall in favor of shaping their religious identity into a model of
overarching tolerance of each other. The society in which Layla and Karim
live has not yet arrived at this moment, but their hesitant steps forward
certainly indicate that some of Egyptian society may be moving ever closer
to embracing the value of tolerance. As this unfolds, more stories like
Layla and Karim’s will be recounted, but the narrators will tell of different
endings.
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members of groups, but as bearers of rights. . . . In the public sphere, group
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